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Abstract
Most modern systems strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in
exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information.
We initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition—how such systems
balance the exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here the users play three
distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning,
and they are self-interested agents which choose among the competing systems.
In our model, we consider competition between two multi-armed bandit algorithms faced
with the same bandit instance. Users arrive one by one and choose among the two algorithms,
so that each algorithm makes progress if and only if it is chosen. We ask whether and to what
extent competition incentivizes the adoption of better bandit algorithms. We investigate this
issue for several models of user response, as we vary the degree of rationality and competi-
tiveness in the model. Our findings are closely related to the “competition vs. innovation”
relationship, a well-studied theme in economics.
1 Introduction
Learning from interactions with users is ubiquitous in modern customer-facing systems, from
product recommendations to web search to spam detection to content selection to fine-tuning
the interface. Many systems purposefully implement exploration: making potentially suboptimal
choices for the sake of acquiring new information. Randomized controlled trials, a.k.a. A/B test-
ing, are an industry standard, with a number of companies such as Optimizely offering tools and
platforms to facilitate them. Many companies use more sophisticated exploration methodologies
based on multi-armed bandits, a well-known theoretical framework for exploration and making
decisions under uncertainty.
Systems that engage in exploration typically need to compete against one another; most im-
portantly, they compete for users. This creates an interesting tension between exploration and
competition. In a nutshell, while exploring may be essential for improving the service tomorrow,
it may degrade quality and make users leave today, in which case there will be no users to learn
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Rationality/competitiveness
Better algorithms
Figure 1: Inverted-U relationship between rationality/competitiveness and algorithms.
from! Thus, users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they gen-
erate data for the systems to learn from, and they are self-interested agents which choose among
the competing systems.
We initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition. The main high-level
question is: whether and to what extent competition incentivizes adoption of better explo-
ration algorithms. This translates into a number of more concrete questions. While it is com-
monly assumed that better learning technology always helps, is this so for our setting? In other
words, would a better learning algorithm result in higher utility for a principal? Would it be used
in an equilibrium of the “competition game”? Also, does competition lead to better social wel-
fare compared to a monopoly? We investigate these questions for several models, as we vary the
capacity of users to make rational decisions (rationality) and the severity of competition between
the learning systems (competitiveness). The two are controlled by the same “knob” in our models;
such coupling is not unusual in the literature, e.g., see Gabaix et al. (2016).
On a high level, our contributions can be framed in terms of the “inverted-U relationship”
between rationality/competitiveness and the quality of adopted algorithms (see Figure 1).
Our model. We define a game in which two firms (principals) simultaneously engage in explo-
ration and compete for users (agents). These two processes are interlinked, as exploration deci-
sions are experienced by users and informed by their feedback. We need to specify several concep-
tual pieces: how the principals and agents interact, what is the machine learning problem faced
by each principal, and what is the information structure. Each piece can get rather complicated
in isolation, let alone jointly, so we strive for simplicity. Thus, the basic model is as follows:
• A new agent arrives in each round t = 1,2, . . ., and chooses among the two principals. The
principal chooses an action (e.g., a list of web search results to show to the agent), the user
experiences this action, and reports a reward. All agents have the same “decision rule” for
choosing among the principals given the available information.
• Each principal faces a very basic and well-studied version of the multi-armed bandit prob-
lem: for each arriving agent, it chooses from a fixed set of actions (a.k.a. arms) and receives
a reward drawn independently from a fixed distribution specific to this action.
• Principals simultaneously announce their learning algorithms before round 1, and cannot
change them afterwards. There is a common Bayesian prior on the rewards (but the realized
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reward distributions are not observed by the principals or the agents). Agents do not receive
any other information. Each principal only observes agents that chose him.
Technical results. Our results depend crucially on agents’ “decision rule” for choosing among
the principals. The simplest and perhaps the most obvious rule is to select the principal which
maximizes their expected utility; we refer to it as HardMax. We find that HardMax is not conducive
to adopting better algorithms. In fact, each principal’s dominant strategy is to do no purposeful
exploration whatsoever, and instead always choose an action that maximizes expected reward
given the current information; we call this algorithm DynamicGreedy. While this algorithm may
potentially try out different actions over time and acquire useful information, it is known to be
dramatically bad in many important cases of multi-armed bandits — precisely because it does not
explore on purpose, and may therefore fail to discover best/better actions. Further, we show that
HardMax is very sensitive to tie-breaking when both principals have exactly the same expected
utility according to agents’ beliefs. If tie-breaking is probabilistically biased — say, principal 1 is
always chosen with probability strictly larger than 12 — then this principal has a simple “winning
strategy” no matter what the other principal does.
We relax HardMax to allow each principal to be chosen with some fixed baseline probability.
One intuitive interpretation is that there are “random agents” who choose a principal uniformly
at random, and each arriving agent is either HardMax or “random” with some fixed probability.
We call this model HardMax&Random. We find that better algorithms help in a big way: a suf-
ficiently better algorithm is guaranteed to win all non-random agents after an initial learning
phase. While the precise notion of “sufficiently better algorithm” is rather subtle, we note that
commonly known “smart” bandit algorithms typically defeat the commonly known “naive” ones,
and the latter typically defeat DynamicGreedy. However, there is a substantial caveat: one can
defeat any algorithm by interleaving it with DynamicGreedy. This has two undesirable corollaries:
a better algorithm may sometimes lose, and a pure Nash equilibrium typically does not exist.
We further relax the decision rule so that the probability of choosing a given principal varies
smoothly as a function of the difference between principals’ expected rewards; we call it SoftMax.
For this model, the “better algorithmwins” result holds under much weaker assumptions on what
constitutes a better algorithm. This is the most technical result of the paper. The competition in
this setting is necessarily much more relaxed: typically, both principals attract approximately half
of the agents as time goes by (but a better algorithm may attract slightly more).
All results extend to a much more general version of the multi-armed bandit problem in which
the principal may observe additional feedback before and/or after each decision, as long as the
feedback distribution does not change over time. In most results, principal’s utility may depend
on both the market share and agents’ rewards.
Economic interpretation. The inverted-U relationship between the severity of competition among
firms and the quality of technologies that they adopt is a familiar theme in the economics litera-
ture (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; Vives, 2008).1 We find it illuminating to frame our contributions
in a similar manner, as illustrated in Figure 1.
1The literature frames this relationship as one between “competition” and “innovation”. In this context, “innova-
tion” refers to adoption of a better technology, at a substantial R&D expense to a given firm. It is not salient whether
similar ideas and/or technologies already exist outside the firm. It is worth noting that adoption of exploration algo-
rithms tends to require substantial R&D effort in practice, even if the algorithms themselves are well-known in the
research literature; see Agarwal et al. (2016) for an example of such R&D effort.
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Our models differ in terms of rationality in agents’ decision-making: from fully rational de-
cisions with HardMax to relaxed rationality with HardMax&Random to an even more relaxed ra-
tionality with SoftMax. The same distinctions also control the severity of competition between
the principals: from cut-throat competition with HardMax to a more relaxed competition with
HardMax&Random, to an even more relaxed competition with SoftMax. Indeed, with HardMax you
lose all customers as soon as you fall behind in performance, with HardMax&Random you get some
small market share no matter what, and with SoftMax you are further guaranteed a market share
close to 12 as long as your performance is not much worse than the competition. The uniform
choice among principals corresponds to no rationality and no competition.
We identify the inverted-U relationship in the spirit of Figure 1 that is driven by the rational-
ity/competitiveness distinctions outlined above: from HardMax to HardMax&Random to SoftMax to
Uniform. We also find another, technically different inverted-U relationship which zeroes in on
the HardMax&Randommodel. We vary rationality/competitiveness inside this model, and track the
marginal utility of switching to a better algorithm.
These inverted-U relationships arise for a fundamentally different reason, compared to the
existing literature on “competition vs. innovation.” In the literature, better technology always
helps in a competitive environment, other things being equal. Thus, the tradeoff is between the
costs of improving the technology and the benefits that the improved technology provides in the
competition. Meanwhile, we find that a better exploration algorithm may sometimes perform
much worse under competition, even in the absence of R&D costs.
Discussion. We capture some pertinent features of reality while ignoring some others for the
sake of tractability. Most notably, we assume that agents do not receive any information about
other agents’ rewards after the game starts. In the final analysis, this assumption makes agents’
behavior independent of a particular realization of the Bayesian prior, and therefore enables us
to summarize each learning algorithm via its Bayesian-expected rewards (as opposed to detailed
performance on the particular realizations of the prior). Such summarization is essential for for-
mulating lucid and general analytic results, let alone proving them. It is a major open question
whether one can incorporate signals about other agents’ rewards and obtain a tractable model.
We also make a standard assumption that agents are myopic: they do not worry about how
their actions impact their future utility. In particular, they do not attempt to learn over time, to
second-guess or game future agents, or to manipulate principal’s learning algorithm. We believe
this is a typical case in practice, in part because agent’s influence tend to be small compared to the
overall system. We model this simply by assuming that each agent only arrives once.
Much of the challenge in this paper, both conceptual and technical, was in setting up the right
model and the matching theorems, and not only in proving the theorems. Apart from making
the modeling choices described above, it was crucial to interpret the results and intuitions from
the literature on multi-armed bandits so as to formulate meaningful assumptions on bandit algo-
rithms and Bayesian priors which are productive in our setting.
Open questions. How to incorporate signals about the other agents’ rewards? One needs to reason
about how exact or coarse these signals are, and how the agents update their beliefs after receiving
them. Also, one may need to allow principals’ learning algorithms to respond to updates about
the other principal’s performance. (Or not, since this is not how learning algorithms are usually
designed!) A clean, albeit idealized, model would be that (i) each agent learns her exact expected
reward from each principal before she needs to choose which principal to go to, but (ii) these
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updates are invisible to the principals. Even then, one needs to argue about the competition on
particular realizations of the Bayesian prior, which appears very challenging.
Another promising extension is to heterogeneous agents. Then the agents’ choices are im-
pacted by their idiosyncratic signals/beliefs, instead of being entirely determined by priors and/or
signals about the average performance. It would be particularly interesting to investigate the
emergence of specialization: whether/when an algorithm learns to target specific population seg-
ments in order to compete against a more powerful “incumbent”.
Map of the paper. We survey related work (Section 2), lay out the model and preliminaries (Sec-
tion 3), and proceed to analyze the three main models, HardMax, HardMax&Random and SoftMax
(in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively). We discuss economic implications in Section 7. Appendix A
provides some pertinent background on multi-armed bandits. Appendix B gives a broad example
to support an assumption in our model.
2 Related work
Multi-armed bandits (MAB) is a particularly elegant and tractable abstraction for tradeoff be-
tween exploration and exploitation: essentially, between acquisition and usage of information.
MAB problems have been studied in Economics, Operations Research and Computer Science for
many decades; see (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012; Gittins et al., 2011; Slivkins, 2017) for back-
ground on regret-minimizing and Bayesian formulations, respectively. A discussion of industrial
applications of MAB can be found in Agarwal et al. (2016).
The literature on MAB is vast and multi-threaded. The most related thread concerns regret-
minimizingMAB formulations with IID rewards (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Auer et al., 2002a). This
thread includes “smart” MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, such as
UCB1 (Auer et al., 2002a) and Successive Elimination (Even-Dar et al., 2006), and “naive” MAB
algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation, including explore-first and ǫ-Greedy (e.g., see
Slivkins, 2017).
The three-way tradeoff between exploration, exploitation and incentives has been studied in
several other settings: incentivizing exploration in a recommendation system (Che and Ho¨rner,
2015; Frazier et al., 2014; Kremer et al., 2014;Mansour et al., 2015; Bimpikis et al., 2017; Bahar et al.,
2016;Mansour et al., 2016), dynamic auctions (e.g., Athey and Segal, 2013; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki,
2010; Kakade et al., 2013), pay-per-click ad auctions with unknown click probabilities (e.g., Babaioff et al.,
2014; Devanur and Kakade, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015), coordinating search andmatching by self-
interested agents (Kleinberg et al., 2016), as well as human computation (e.g., Ho et al., 2016;
Ghosh and Hummel, 2013; Singla and Krause, 2013).
Bolton and Harris (1999); Keller et al. (2005); Gummadi et al. (2012) studiedmodels with self-
interested agents jointly performing exploration, with no principal to coordinate them.
There is a superficial similarity (in name only) between this paper and the line of work on
“dueling bandits” (e.g., Yue et al., 2012; Yue and Joachims, 2009). The latter is not about compet-
ing bandit algorithms, but rather about scenarios where in each round two arms are chosen to be
presented to a user, and the algorithm only observes which arm has “won the duel”.
Our setting is closely related to the “dueling algorithms” framework (Immorlica et al., 2011)
which studies competition between two principals, each running an algorithm for the same prob-
lem. However, this work considers algorithms for offline / full input scenarios, whereas we focus
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on online machine learning and the explore-exploit-incentives tradeoff therein. Also, this work
specifically assumes binary payoffs (i.e., win or lose) for the principals.
Other related work in economics. The competition vs. innovation relationship and the inverted-
U shape thereof have been introduced in a classic book (Schumpeter, 1942), and remained an
important theme in the literature ever since (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; Vives, 2008). Production
costs aside, this literature treats innovation as a priori beneficial for the firm. Our setting is very
different, as innovation in exploration algorithms may potentially hurt the firm.
A line of work on platform competition, starting with Rysman (2009), concerns competition be-
tween firms (platforms) that improve as they attract more users (network effect); seeWeyl and White
(2014) for a recent survey. This literature is not concerned with innovation, and typically mod-
els network effects exogenously, whereas in our model network effects are endogenous: they are
created by MAB algorithms, an essential part of the model.
Relaxed versions of rationality similar to ours are found in several notable lines of work. For
example, “randomagents” (a.k.a. noise traders) can side-step the “no-trade theorem” (Milgrom and Stokey,
1982), a famous impossibility result in financial economics. The SoftMax model is closely related
to the literature on product differentiation, starting from Hotelling (1929), see Perloff and Salop
(1985) for a notable later paper.
There is a large literature on non-existence of equilibria due to small deviations (which is
related to the corresponding result for HardMax&Random), starting with Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) in the context of health insurance markets. Notable recent papers (Veiga and Weyl, 2016;
Azevedo and Gottlieb, 2017) emphasize the distinction between HardMax and versions of SoftMax.
3 Our model and preliminaries
Principals and agents. There are two principals and T agents. The game proceeds in rounds (we
will sometimes refer to them as global rounds). In each round t ∈ [T ], the following interaction
takes place. A new agent arrives and chooses one of the two principals. The principal chooses a
recommendation: an action at ∈ A, where A is a fixed set of actions (same for both principals and
all rounds). The agent follows this recommendation, receives a reward rt ∈ [0,1], and reports it
back to the principal.
The rewards are i.i.d. with a common prior. More formally, for each action a ∈ A there is
a parametric family ψa(·) of reward distributions, parameterized by the mean reward µa. (The
paradigmatic case is 0-1 rewards with a given expectation.) The mean reward vector µ = (µa : a ∈
A) is drawn from prior distribution Pmean before round 1. Whenever a given action a ∈ A is chosen,
the reward is drawn independently from distributionψa(µa). The prior Pmean and the distributions
(ψa(·) : a ∈ A) constitute the (full) Bayesian prior on rewards, denoted P .
Each principal commits to a learning algorithm for making recommendations. This algorithm
follows a protocol of multi-armed bandits (MAB). Namely, the algorithm proceeds in time-steps:2
each time it is called, it outputs a chosen action a ∈ A and then inputs the reward for this action.
The algorithm is called only in global rounds when the corresponding principal is chosen.
The information structure is as follows. The prior P is known to everyone. The mean rewards
µa are not revealed to anybody. Each agent knows both principals’ algorithms, and the global
2These time-steps will sometimes be referred to as local steps/rounds, so as to distinguish them from “global rounds”
defined before. We will omit the local vs. local distinction when clear from the context.
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round when (s)he arrives, but not the rewards of the previous agents. Each principal is completely
unaware of the rounds when the other is chosen.
Some terminology. The two principals are called “Principal 1” and “Principal 2”. The algorithm
of principal i ∈ {1,2} is called “algorithm i” and denoted algi . The agent in global round t is called
“agent t”; the chosen principal is denoted it .
Throughout, E[·] denotes expectation over all applicable randomness.
Bayesian-expected rewards. Consider the performance of a given algorithm algi , i ∈ {1,2}, when
it is run in isolation (i.e., without competition, just as a bandit algorithm). Let rewi(n) denote its
Bayesian-expected reward for the n-th step.
Now, going back to our game, fix global round t and let ni(t) denote the number of global
rounds before t in which this principal is chosen. Then:
E[rt | principal i is chosen in round t and ni(t) = n] = rewi(n+1) (∀n ∈N).
Agents’ response. Each agent t chooses principal it as as follows: it chooses a distribution over
the principals, and then draws independently from this distribution. Let pt be the probability of
choosing principal 1 according to this distribution. Below we specify pt ; we need to be careful so
as to avoid a circular definition.
Let It be the information available to agent t before the round. Assume It suffices to form
posteriors for quantities ni(t), i ∈ {1,2}, denote them by Ni,t . Note that the Bayesian expected
reward of each principal i is a function only of the number rounds he was chosen by the agents,
so the posterior mean reward for each principal i can be written as
PMRi (t) := E[rt | It and it = i] =E[rewi(ni(t) + 1) | It] = E
n∼Ni,t
[rewi(n+1)].
This quantity represents the posterior mean reward for principal i at round t, according to in-
formation It ; hence the notation PMR. In general, probability pt is defined by the posterior mean
rewards PMRi (t) for both principals. We assume a somewhat more specific shape:
pt = fresp ( PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) ) . (1)
Here fresp : [−1,1]→ [0,1] is the response function, which is the same for all agents. We assume
that the response function is known to all agents.
To make the model well-defined, it remains to argue that information It is indeed sufficient to
form posteriors on n1(t) and n2(t). This can be easily seen using induction on t.
Since all agents arrive with identical information (other than knowing which global round
they arrive in), it follows that all agents have identical posteriors for ni,t (for a given principal i
and a given global round t). This posterior is denotedNi,t.
Response functions. We use the response function fresp to characterize the amount of rationality
and competitiveness in our model. We assume that fresp is monotonically non-decreasing, is
larger than 12 on the interval (0,1], and smaller than
1
2 on the interval [−1,0). Beyond that, we
consider three specific models, listed in the order of decreasing rationality and competitiveness
(see Figure 2):
• HardMax: fresp equals 0 on the interval [−1,0) and 1 on the interval (0,1]. In other words, the
agents will deterministically choose the principal with the higher posterior mean reward.
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∆t := PMR1(t)− PMR2(t)
pt = prob. of choosing principal 1
1/2
1
0 1−1
Figure 2: The three models for agents’ response function: HardMax is thick blue, HardMax&Random
is slim red, and SoftMax is the dashed curve.
• HardMax&Random: fresp equals ǫ0 on the interval [−1,0) and 1 − ǫ0 on the interval (0,1],
where ǫ0 ∈ (0, 12 ) are some positive constants. In words, each agent is a HardMax agent with
probability 1− 2ǫ0, and with the remaining probability she makes a random choice.
• SoftMax: fresp(·) lies in the interval [ǫ0,1−ǫ0], ǫ0 > 0, and is “smooth” around 0 (in the sense
defined precisely in Section 6).
We say that fresp is symmetric if fresp(−x) + fresp(x) = 1 for any x ∈ [0,1]. This implies fair
tie-breaking: fresp(0) =
1
2 .
MAB algorithms. We characterize the inherent quality of an MAB algorithm in terms of its
Bayesian Instantaneous Regret (henceforth, BIR), a standard notion from machine learning:
BIR(n) := E
µ∼Pmean
[
max
a∈A
µa
]
− rew(n), (2)
where rew(n) is the Bayesian-expected reward of the algorithm for the n-th step, when the algo-
rithm is run in isolation. We are primarily interested in how BIR scales with n; we treat K , the
number of arms, as a constant unless specified otherwise.
We will emphasize several specific algorithms or classes thereof:
• “smart”MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, such as UCB1 Auer et al.
(2002a) and Successive Elimination Even-Dar et al. (2006). These algorithms achieve BIR(n) ≤
O˜(n−1/2) for all priors and all (or all but a very few) steps n. This bound is known to be tight
for any fixed n. 3
• “naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation, such as Explore-then-
Exploit and ǫ-Greedy. These algorithms have dedicated rounds in which they explore by
choosing an action uniformly at random. When these rounds are known in advance, the
algorithm suffers constant BIR in such rounds. When the “exploration rounds” are instead
randomly chosen by the algorithm, one can usually guarantee an inverse-polynomial upper
bound BIR, but not as good as the one above: namely, BIR(n) ≤ O˜(n−1/3). This is the best
possible upper bound on BIR for the two algorithms mentioned above.
• DynamicGreedy: at each step, recommends the best action according to the current posterior:
an action a with the highest posterior expected reward E[µa | I ], where I is the information
3This follows from the lower-bound analysis in Auer et al. (2002b).
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available to the algorithm so far. DynamicGreedy has (at least) a constant BIR for some
reasonable priors, i.e., BIR(n) >Ω(1).
• StaticGreedy: always recommends the prior best action,i.e., an action a with the highest
prior mean reward Eµ∼Pmean[µa]. This algorithm typically has constant BIR.
We focus onMAB algorithms such that BIR(n) is non-increasing; we call such algorithmsmono-
tone. While some reasonable MAB algorithms may occasionally violate monotonicity, they can
usually be easily modified so that monotonicity violations either vanish altogether, or only occur
at very specific rounds (so that agents are extremely unlikely to exploit them in practice).
More background and examples can be found in Appendix A. In particular, we prove that
DynamicGreedy is monotone.
Competition game between principals. Some of our results explicitly study the game between
the two principals. We model it as a simultaneous-move game: before the first agent arrives, each
principal commits to an MAB algorithm. Thus, choosing a pure strategy in this game corresponds
to choosing an MAB algorithm (and, implicitly, announcing this algorithm to the agents).
Principal’s utility is primarily defined as the market share, i.e., the number of agents that chose
this principal. Principals are risk-neutral, in the sense that they optimize their expected utility.
Assumptions on the prior. We make some technical assumptions for the sake of simplicity. First,
each action a has a positive probability of being the best action according to the prior:
∀a ∈ A : Pr
µ∼Pmean
[µa > µa′ ∀a′ ∈ A] > 0. (3)
Second, posterior mean rewards of actions are pairwise distinct almost surely. That is, the
history h at any step of an MAB algorithm4 satisfies
E[µa | h] , E[µa′ | h] ∀a,a′ ∈ A, (4)
except at a set of histories of probability 0. In particular, prior mean rewards of actions are pair-
wise distinct: E[µa] , E[µ
′
a] for any a,a
′ ∈ A.
We provide two examples for which property (4) is ‘generic’, in the sense that it can be enforced
almost surely by a small random perturbation of the prior. Both examples focus on 0-1 rewards
and priors Pmean that are independent across arms. The first example assumes Beta priors on the
mean rewards, and is very easy.5 The second example assumes that mean rewards have a finite
support, see Appendix B for details.
Somemore notation. Without loss of generality, we label actions as A = [K] and sort them accord-
ing to their prior mean rewards, so that E[µ1] >E[µ2] > . . . > E[µK ].
Fix principal i ∈ {1,2} and (local) step n. The arm chosen by algorithm algi at this step is
denoted ai,n, and the corresponding BIR is denoted BIRi(n). History of algi up to this step is
denoted Hi,n.
Write PMR(a | E) = E[µa | E] for posterior mean reward of action a given event E.
4The history of an MAB algorithm at a given step comprises the chosen actions and the observed rewards in all
previous steps in the execution of this algorithm.
5Suppose the rewards are Bernouli r.v. and the mean reward µa for each arm a is drawn from some Beta distribution
Beta(αa ,βa). Given any history that contains ha number of heads and ta number of tails from arm a, the posterior
mean reward is
αa+ha
αa+ha+βa+ta
. Note that ha and ta take integer values. Therefore, perturbing the parameters αa and βa
independently with any continuous noise will induce a prior with property (4) with probability 1.
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3.1 Generalizations
Our results can be extended compared to the basic model described above.
First, unless specified otherwise, our results allow a more general notion of principal’s utility
that can depend on both the market share and agents’ rewards. Namely, principal i collects Ui(rt)
units of utility in each global round t when she is chosen (and 0 otherwise), where Ui(·) is some
fixed non-decreasing function with Ui(0) > 0. In a formula,
Ui :=
∑T
t=1 1{it=i} ·Ui(rr ). (5)
Second, our results carry over, with little or no modification of the proofs, to much more
general versions of MAB, as long as it satisfies the i.i.d. property. In each round, an algorithm can
see a context before choosing an action (as in contextual bandits) and/or additional feedback other
than the reward after the reward is chosen (as in, e.g., semi-bandits), as long as the contexts are
drawn from a fixed distribution, and the (reward, feedback) pair is drawn from a fixed distribution
that depends only on the context and the chosen action. The Bayesian prior P needs to be a more
complicated object, to make sure that PMR and BIR are well-defined. Mean rewardsmay also have a
known structure, such as Lipschitzness, convexity, or linearity; such structure can be incorporated
via P . All these extensions have been studied extensively in the literature onMAB, and account for
a substantial segment thereof; see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) for background and details.
3.2 Chernoff Bounds
Weuse an elementary concentration inequality known asChernoff Bounds, in a formulation fromMitzenmacher and Upfal
(2005).
Theorem 3.1 (Chernoff Bounds). Consider n i.i.d. random variables X1 . . .Xn with values in [0,1]. Let
X = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi be their average, and let ν = E[X]. Then:
min( Pr[X − ν > δν], Pr[ν −X > δν] ) < e−νnδ2/3 for any δ ∈ (0,1).
4 Full rationality (HardMax)
In this section, we will consider the version in which the agents are fully rational, in the sense that
their response function is HardMax. We show that principals are not incentivized to explore—
i.e., to deviate from DynamicGreedy. The core technical result is that if one principal adopts
DynamicGreedy, then the other principal loses all agents as soon as he deviates.
To make this more precise, let us say that two MAB algorithms deviate at (local) step n if there
is an action a ∈ A and a set of step-n histories of positive probability such that any history h in this
set is feasible for both algorithms, and under this history the two algorithms choose action a with
different probability.
Theorem4.1. Assume HardMax response function with fair tie-breaking. Assume that alg1 is DynamicGreedy,
and alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from some (local) step n0 < T . Then all agents in global
rounds t ≥ n0 select principal 1.
Corollary 4.2. The competition game between principals has a unique Nash equilibirium: both princi-
pals choose DynamicGreedy.
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Remark 4.3. This corollary holds under a more general model which allows time-discounting:
namely, the utility of each principal i in each global round t is Ui,t(rt) if this principal is chosen,
and 0 otherwise, where Ui,t(·) is an arbitrary non-decreasing function with Ui,t(0) > 0.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The proof starts with two auxiliary lemmas: that deviating from DynamicGreedy implies a strictly
smaller Bayesian-expected reward, and that HardMax implies a “sudden-death” property: if one
agent chooses principal 1 with certainty, then so do all subsequent agents do. We re-use both
lemmas in later sections, so we state them in sufficient generality.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that alg1 is DynamicGreedy, and alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting
from some (local) step n0 < T . Then rew1(n0) > rew2(n0). This holds for any response function fresp.
Lemma 4.4 does not rely on any particular shape of the response function because it only
considers the performance of each algorithm without competition.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Since the two algorithms coincide on the first n0−1 steps, it follows by symme-
try that histories H1,n0 and H2,n0 have the same distribution. We use a coupling argument: w.l.o.g.,
we assume the two histories coincide, H1,n0 =H2,n0 =H.
At local step n0, DynamicGreedy chooses an action a1,n0 = a1,n0(H) which maximizes the poste-
rior mean reward given history H: for any realized history h ∈ support(H) and any action a ∈ A
PMR(a1,n0 |H = h) ≥ PMR(a |H = h). (6)
By assumption (4), it follows that
PMR(a1,n0 |H = h) > PMR(a |H = h) for any h ∈ support(H) and a , a1,n0(h). (7)
Since the two algorithms deviate at step n0, there is a set S ⊂ support(H) of step-n0 histories
such that Pr[S] > 0 and any history h ∈ S satisfies Pr[a2,n0 , a1,n0 |H = h] > 0. Combining this with
(7), we deduce that
PMR(a1,n0 |H = h) > E
[
µa2,n0 |H = h
]
for each history h ∈ S. (8)
Using (6) and (8) and integrating over realized histories h, we obtain rew1(n0) > rew2(n0).
Lemma 4.5. Consider HardMax response function with fresp(0) ≥ 12 . Suppose alg1 is monotone, and
PMR1(t0) > PMR2(t0) for some global round t0. Then PMR1(t) > PMR2(t) for all subsequent rounds t.
Proof. Let us use induction on round t ≥ t0, with the base case t = t0. LetN =N1,t0 be the agents’
posterior distribution for n1,t0 , the number of global rounds before t0 in which principal 1 is
chosen. By induction, all agents from t0 to t−1 chose principal 1, so PMR2(t0) = PMR2(t). Therefore,
PMR1(t) = E
n∼N
[rew1(n+1+ t − t0)] ≥ E
n∼N
[rew1(n+1)] = PMR1(t0) > PMR2(t0) = PMR2(t),
where the first inequality holds because alg1 is monotone, and the second one is the base case.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Since the two algorithms coincide on the first n0−1 steps, it follows by sym-
metry that rew1(n) = rew2(n) for any n < n0. By Lemma 4.4, rew1(n0) > rew2(n0).
Recall that ni(t) is the number of global rounds s < t in which principal i is chosen, and Ni,t
is the agents’ posterior distribution for this quantity. By symmetry, each agent t < n0 chooses a
principal uniformly at random. It follows that N1,n0 = N2,n0 (denote both distributions by N for
brevity), andN (n0 − 1) > 0. Therefore:
PMR1(n0) = E
n∼N
[rew1(n+1)] =
n0−1∑
n=0
N (n) · rew1(n+1)
>N (n0 − 1) · rew2(n0) +
n0−2∑
n=0
N (n) · rew2(n+1)
= E
n∼N
[rew2(n+1)] = PMR2(n0) (9)
So, agent n0 chooses principal 1. By Lemma 4.5 (noting that DynamicGreedy is monotone), all
subsequent agents choose principal 1, too.
4.2 HardMaxwith biased tie-breaking
The HardMaxmodel is very sensitive to the tie-breaking rule. For starters, if ties are broken deter-
ministically in favor of principal 1, then principal 1 can get all agents no matter what the other
principal does, simply by using StaticGreedy.
Theorem 4.6. Assume HardMax response function with fresp(0) = 1 (ties are always broken in favor of
principal 1). If alg1 is StaticGreedy, then all agents choose principal 1.
Proof. Agent 1 chooses principal 1 because of the tie-breaking rule. Since StaticGreedy is triv-
ially monotone, all the subsequent agents choose principal 1 by an induction argument similar to
the one in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
A more challenging scenario is when the tie-breaking is biased in favor of principal 1, but not
deterministically so: fresp(0) >
1
2 . Then this principal also has a “winning strategy” no matter
what the other principal does. Specifically, principal 1 can get all but the first few agents, under a
mild technical assumption that DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy. Principal 1 can use
DynamicGreedy, or any other monotoneMAB algorithm that coincides with DynamicGreedy in the
first few steps.
Theorem 4.7. Assume HardMax response function with fresp(0) >
1
2 (i.e., tie-breaking is biased in favor
of principal 1). Assume the prior P is such that DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy starting
from some step n0. Suppose that principal 1 runs a monotone MAB algorithm that coincides with
DynamicGreedy in the first n0 steps. Then all agents t ≥ n0 choose principal 1.
Proof. The proof re-uses Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, which do not rely on fair tie-breaking.
Because of the biased tie-breaking, for each global round t we have:
if PMR1(t) ≥ PMR2(t) then Pr[it = 1] > 12 . (10)
Recall that it is the principal chosen in global round t.
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Let m0 be the first step when alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy, or DynamicGreedy deviates
from StaticGreedy, whichever comes sooner. Then alg2, DynamicGreedy and StaticGreedy co-
incide on the firstm0−1 steps. Moreover,m0 ≤ n0 (since DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy
at step n0), so alg1 coincides with DynamicGreedy on the first m0 steps.
So, rew1(n) = rew2(n) for each step n < m0, because alg1 and alg2 coincide on the first m0 − 1
steps. Moreover, if alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy at step m0 then rew1(m0) > rew2(m0) by
Lemma 4.4; else, we trivially have rew1(m0) = rew2(m0). To summarize:
rew1(n) ≥ rew2(n) for all steps n ≤m0. (11)
We claim that Pr[it = 1] >
1
2 for all global rounds t ≤ m0. We prove this claim using induction
on t. The base case t = 1 holds by (10) and the fact that in step 1, DynamicGreedy chooses the arm
with the highest prior mean reward. For the induction step, we assume that Pr[it = 1] >
1
2 for all
global rounds t < t0, for some t0 ≤ m0. It follows that distribution N1,t0 stochastically dominates
distributionN2,t0.6 Observe that
PMR1(t0) = E
n∼N1,t0
[rew1(n+1)] ≥ E
n∼N2,t0
[rew2(n+1)] = PMR2(t0). (12)
So the induction step follows by (10). Claim proved.
Now let us focus on global round m0, and denoteNi =Ni,m0 . By the above claim,
N1 stochastically dominatesN2, and moreoverNi(m0 − 1) >Ni(m0 − 1). (13)
By definition of m0, either (i) alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from local step m0,
which implies rew1(m0) > rew2(m0) by Lemma 4.4, or (ii) DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy
starting from local step m0, which implies rew1(m0) > rew1(m0 − 1) by Lemma A.4. In both cases,
using (11) and (13), it follows that the inequality in (12) is strict for t0 =m0.
Therefore, agent m0 chooses principal 1, and by Lemma 4.5 so do all subsequent agents.
5 Relaxed rationality: HardMax & Random
This section is dedicated to the HardMax&Random response model, where each principal is always
chosen with some positive baseline probability. The main technical result for this model states
that a principal with asymptotically better BIR wins by a large margin: after a “learning phase”
of constant duration, all agents choose this principal with maximal possible probability fresp(1).
For example, a principal with BIR(n) ≤ O˜(n−1/2) wins over a principal with BIR(n) ≥ Ω(n−1/3).
However, this positive result comes with a significant caveat detailed in Section 5.1.
We formulate and prove a cleaner version of the result, followed by amore general formulation
developed in a subsequent Remark 5.2. We need to express a property that alg1 eventually catches
up and surpasses alg2, even if initially it receives only a fraction of traffic. For the cleaner version,
we assume that both algorithms arewell-defined for an infinite time horizon, so that their BIR does
not depend on the time horizon T of the game. Then this property can be formalized as:
(∀ǫ > 0) BIR1(ǫn)/BIR2(n)→ 0. (14)
6For random variables X,Y on R, we say that X stochastically dominates Y if Pr[X ≥ x] ≥ Pr[Y ≥ x] for any x ∈R.
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In fact, a weaker version of (14) suffices: denoting ǫ0 = fresp(−1), for some constant n0 we have
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR1(ǫ0n/2)/BIR2(n) < 12 . (15)
We also need a very mild technical assumption on the “bad” algorithm:
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR2(n) > 4e−ǫ0n/12. (16)
Theorem 5.1. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Suppose both algorithms are monotone
and well-defined for an infinite time horizon, and satisfy (15) and (16). Then each agent t ≥ n0 chooses
principal 1 with maximal possible probability fresp(1) = 1− ǫ0.
Proof. Consider global round t ≥ n0. Recall that each agent chooses principal 1 with probability
at least fresp(−1) > 0.
Then E[n1(t+1)] ≥ 2ǫ0 t. By Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 3.1), we have that n1(t+1) ≥ ǫ0t holds
with probability at least 1− q, where q = exp(−ǫ0t/12).
We need to prove that PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) > 0. For any m1 and m2, consider the quantity
∆(m1,m2) := BIR2(m2 +1)− BIR1(m1 +1).
Whenever m1 ≥ ǫ0t/2− 1 and m2 < t, it holds that
∆(m1,m2) ≥ ∆(ǫ0t/2, t) ≥ BIR2(t)/2.
The above inequalities follow, resp., from algorithms’ monotonicity and (15). Now,
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) = E
m1∼N1,t , m2∼N2,t
[∆(m1,m2)]
≥ −q+ E
m1∼N1,t , m2∼N2,t
[∆(m1,m2) |m1 ≥ ǫ0t/2− 1]
≥ BIR2(t)/2− q
> BIR2(t)/4 > 0 (by (16)).
Remark 5.2. Many standard MAB algorithms in the literature are parameterized by the time hori-
zon T . Regret bounds for such algorithms usually include a polylogarithmic dependence on T . In
particular, a typical upper bound for BIR has the following form:
BIR(n | T ) ≤ polylog(T ) · n−γ for some γ ∈ (0, 12 ]. (17)
Here we write BIR(n | T ) to emphasize the dependence on T .
We generalize (15) to handle the dependence on T : there exists a number T0 and a function
n0(T ) ∈ polylog(T ) such that
(∀T ≥ T0, n ≥ n0(T ))
BIR1(ǫ0n/2 | T )
BIR2(n | T )
<
1
2
. (18)
If this holds, we say that alg1 BIR-dominates alg2.
We provide a version of Theorem 5.1 in which algorithms are parameterized with time horizon
T and condition (15) is replaced with (18); its proof is very similar and is omitted.
To state a game-theoretic corollary of Theorem 5.1, we consider a version of the competition
game between the two principals in which they can only choose from a finite set A of mono-
tone MAB algorithms. One of these algorithms is “better” than all others; we call it the special
algorithm. Unless specified otherwise, it BIR-dominates all other allowed algorithms. The other
algorithms satisfy (16). We call this game the restricted competition game.
Corollary 5.3. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Consider the restricted competition game
with special algorithm alg. Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , this game has a unique Nash
equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
5.1 A little greedy goes a long way
Given any monotone MAB algorithm other than DynamicGreedy, we design a modified algorithm
which learns at a slower rate, yet “wins the game” in the sense of Theorem 5.1. As a corollary, the
competition game with unrestricted choice of algorithms typically does not have a Nash equilib-
rium.
Given an algorithm alg1 that deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from step n0 and a “mix-
ing” parameter p, we will construct a modified algorithm as follows.
1. The modified algorithm coincides with alg1 (and DynamicGreedy) for the first n0 − 1 steps;
2. In each step n ≥ n0, alg1 is invokedwith probability 1−p, andwith the remaining probability
p does the “greedy choice”: chooses an action with the largest posterior mean reward given
the current information collected by alg1.
For a cleaner comparison between the two algorithms, the modified algorithm does not record
rewards received in steps with the “greedy choice”. Parameter p > 0 is the same for all steps.
Theorem 5.4. Assume symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Let ǫ0 = fresp(−1) be the base-
line probability. Suppose alg1 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from some step n0. Let alg2 be
the modified algorithm, as described above, with mixing parameter p such that (1−ǫ0)(1−p) > ǫ0. Then
each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 2 with maximal possible probability 1− ǫ0.
Corollary 5.5. Suppose that both principals can choose any monotone MAB algorithm, and assume
the symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Then for any time horizon T , the only possible
pure Nash equilibrium is one where both principals choose DynamicGreedy. Moreover, no pure Nash
equilibrium exists when some algorithm “dominates” DynamicGreedy in the sense of (18) and the time
horizon T is sufficiently large.
Remark 5.6. The modified algorithm performs exploration at a slower rate. Let us argue how this
may translate into a larger BIR compared to the original algorithm. Let BIR′1(n) be the BIR of the
“greedy choice” after after n− 1 steps of alg1. Then
BIR2(n) = E
m∼(n0−1)+Binomial(n−n0+1,1−p)
[
(1− p) · BIR1(m) + p · BIR′1(m)
]
. (19)
In this expression, m is the number of times alg1 is invoked in the first n steps of the modified
algorithm. Note that E[m] = n0 − 1+ (n− n0 +1)(1− p) ≥ (1− p)n.
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Suppose BIR1(n) = βn
−γ for some constants β,γ > 0. Further, assume BIR′1(n) ≥ c BIR1(n), for
some c > 1−γ . Then for all n ≥ n0 and small enough p > 0 it holds that:
BIR2(n) ≥ (1− p + pc) E[ BIR1(m) ]
E[ BIR1(m) ] ≥ BIR1( E[m] ) (By Jensen’s inequality)
≥ BIR1( (1− p)n ) (since E[m] ≥ n(1− p))
≥ β · n−γ · (1− p)−γ (plugging in BIR1(n) = βn−γ )
> BIR1(n) (1− pγ )−1 (since (1− p)γ < 1− pγ ).
BIR2(n) > α · BIR1(n), where α = 1−p+pc1−pγ > 1.
(In the above equations, all expectations are over m distributed as in (19).)
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Let rew′1(n) denote the Bayesian-expected reward of the “greedy choice” af-
ter after n− 1 steps of alg1. Note that rew1(·) and rew′1(·) are non-decreasing: the former because
alg1 is monotone and the latter because the “greedy choice” is only improved with an increasing
set of observations. Therefore, the modified algorithm alg2 is monotone by (19).
By definition of the “greedy choice,” rew1(n) ≤ rew′1(n) for all steps n. Moreover, by Lemma 4.4,
alg1 has a strictly smaller rew(n0) compared to DynamicGreedy; so, rew1(n0) < rew2(n0).
Let alg denote a copy of alg1 that is running “inside” the modified algorithm alg2. Let m2(t)
be the number of global rounds before t in which the agent chooses principal 2 and alg is invoked;
in other words, it is the number of agents seen by alg before global round t. LetM2,t be the agents’
posterior distribution for m2(t).
We claim that in each global round t ≥ n0, distribution M2,t stochastically dominates distri-
bution N1,t, and PMR1(t) < PMR2(t). We use induction on t. The base case t = n0 holds because
M2,t =N1,t (because the two algorithms coincide on the first n0−1 steps), and PMR1(n0) < PMR2(n0)
is proved as in (9), using the fact that rew1(n0) < rew2(n0).
The induction step is proved as follows. The induction hypothesis for global round t−1 implies
that agent t − 1 is seen by alg with probability (1− ǫ0)(1− p), which is strictly larger than ǫ0, the
probability with which this agent is seen by alg2. Therefore,M2,t stochastically dominatesN1,t.
PMR1(t) = E
n∼N1,t
[rew1(n+1)]
≤ E
m∼M2,t
[rew1(m+1)] (20)
< E
m∼M2,t
[
(1− p) · rew1(m+1) + p · rew′1(m+1)
]
(21)
= PMR2(t).
Here inequality (20) holds because rew1(·) is monotone and M2,t stochastically dominates N1,t,
and inequality (21) holds because rew1(n0) < rew2(n0) andM2,t(n0) > 0.7
6 SoftMax response function
This section is devoted to the SoftMaxmodel. We recover a positive result under the assumptions
fromTheorem 5.1 (albeit with a weaker conclusion), and then proceed to amuchmore challenging
7If rew1(·) is strictly increasing, then inequality (20) is strict, too; this is becauseM2,t (t − 1) >N1,t (t − 1).
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result under weaker assumptions. We start with a formal definition:
Definition 6.1. A response function fresp is SoftMax if the following conditions hold:
• fresp(·) is bounded away from 0 and 1: fresp(·) ∈ [ǫ,1− ǫ] for some ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ),
• the response function fresp(·) is “smooth” around 0:
∃constants δ0, c0, c′0 > 0 ∀x ∈ [−δ0,δ0] c0 ≤ f ′resp(x) ≤ c′0. (22)
• fair tie-breaking: fresp(0) = 12 .
Remark 6.2. This definition is fruitful when parameters c0 and c
′
0 are close to
1
2 . Throughout, we
assume that alg1 is better than alg2, and obtain results parameterized by c0. By symmetry, one
could assume that alg2 is better than alg1, and obtain similar results parameterized by c
′
0.
Our first result is a version of Theorem 5.1, with the same assumptions about the algorithms
and essentially the same proof. The conclusion is much weaker: we can only guarantee that
each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 1 with probability slightly larger than 12 . This is essentially
unavoidable in a typical case when both algorithms satisfy BIR(n)→ 0, by Definition 6.1.
Theorem 6.3. Assume SoftMax response function. Suppose alg1 has better BIR in the sense of (15),
and alg2 satisfies the condition (16). Then each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 1 with probability
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 + c04 BIR2(t). (23)
Proof Sketch. We follow the steps in the proof of Theorem 5.1 to derive
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) ≥ BIR2(t)/2− q, where q = exp(−ǫ0t/12).
This is at least BIR2(t)/4 by (16). Then (23) follows by the smoothness condition (22).
We recover a version of Corollary 5.3, if each principal’s utility is the number of users (rather
than the more general model in (5)). We also need a mild technical assumption that cumulative
Bayesian regret (BReg) tends to infinity. BReg is a standard notion from the literature (along with
BIR):
BReg(n) := n · E
µ∼Pmean
[
max
a∈A
µa
]
−
n∑
n=1
rew(n′) =
n∑
n′=1
BIR(n′). (24)
Corollary 6.4. Assume that the response function is SoftMax, and each principal’s utility is the number
of users. Consider the restricted competition game with special algorithm alg, and assume that all other
allowed algorithms satisfy BReg(n)→∞. Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , this game has
a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
Further, we prove a much more challenging result in which the condition (15) is replaced with
amuch weaker “BIR-dominance” condition. For clarity, we will again assume that both algorithms
are well-defined for an infinite time horizon. The weak BIR dominance condition says there exist
constants β0,α0 ∈ (0,1/2) and n0 such that
(∀n ≥ n0)
BIR1((1− β0)n)
BIR2(n)
< 1−α0. (25)
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If this holds, we say that alg1 weakly BIR-dominates alg2. Note that the condition (18) involves
sufficiently small multiplicative factors (resp., ǫ0/2 and
1
2 ), the new condition replaces them with
factors that can be arbitrarily close to 1.
We make a mild assumption on alg1 that its BIR1(n) tends to 0. Formally, for any ǫ > 0, there
exists some n(ǫ) such that
(∀n ≥ n(ǫ)) BIR1(n) ≤ ǫ. (26)
We also require a slightly stronger version of the technical assumption (16):for some n0,
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR2(n) ≥
4
α0
exp
(−min{ǫ0,1/8}n
12
)
(27)
Theorem 6.5. Assume the SoftMax response function. Suppose alg1 weakly-BIR-dominates alg2,
alg1 satisfies (26), and alg2 satisfies (27). Then there exists some t0 such that each agent t ≥ t0 chooses
principal 1 with probability
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 + c0α04 BIR2(t). (28)
The main idea behind our proof is that even though alg1 may have a slower rate of learning
in the beginning, it will gradually catch up and surpass alg2. We will describe this process in two
phases. In the first phase, alg1 receives a random agent with probability at least fresp(−1) = ǫ0
in each round. Since BIR1 tends to 0, the difference in BIRs between the two algorithms is also
diminishing. Due to the SoftMax response function, alg1 attracts each agent with probability at
least 1/2 −O(β0) after a sufficient number of rounds. Then the game enters the second phase:
both algorithms receive agents at a rate close to 12 , and the fractions of agents received by both
algorithms — n1(t)/t and n2(t)/t — also converge to
1
2 . At the end of the second phase and in each
global round afterwards, the counts n1(t) and n2(t) satisfy the weak BIR-dominance condition, in
the sense that they both are larger than n0 and n1(t) ≥ (1 − β0) n2(t). At this point, alg1 actually
has smaller BIR, which reflected in the PMRs eventually. Accordingly, from then on alg1 attracts
agents at a rate slightly larger than 12 . We prove that the “bump” over
1
2 is at least on the order of
BIR2(t).
Proof of Theorem 6.5. Let β1 = min{c′0δ0,β0/20} with δ0 defined in (22). Recall each agent chooses
alg1 with probability at least fresp(−1) = ǫ0. By condition (26) and (27), there exists some suf-
ficiently large T1 such that for any t ≥ T1, BIR1(ǫ0T1/2) ≤ β1/c′0 and BIR2(t) > e−ǫ0t/12. Moreover,
for any t ≥ T1, we know E[n1(t + 1)] ≥ ǫ0 t, and by the Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 3.1), we have
n1(t + 1) ≥ ǫ0t/2 holds with probability at least 1 − q1(t) with q1(t) = exp(−ǫ0t/12) < BIR2(t). It
follows that for any t ≥ T1,
PMR2(t)− PMR1(t) = E
m1∼N1,t , m2∼N2,t
[BIR1(m1 +1)− BIR2(m2 +1)]
≤ q1(t) + E
m1∼N1,t
[BIR1(m1 +1) |m1 ≥ ǫ0t/2− 1]− BIR2(t)
≤ BIR1(ǫ0T1/2) ≤ β1/c′0
Since the response function fresp is c
′
0-Lipschitz in the neighborhood of [−δ0,δ0], each agent after
round T1 will choose alg1 with probability at least
pt ≥
1
2
− c′0 (PMR2(t)− PMR1(t)) ≥
1
2
− β1.
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Next, we will show that there exists a sufficiently large T2 such that for any t ≥ T1 + T2, with
high probability n1(t) >max{n0, (1−β0)n2(t)}, where n0 is defined in (25). Fix any t ≥ T1+T2. Since
each agent chooses alg1 with probability at least 1/2 − β1, by Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 3.1)
we have with probability at least 1 − q2(t) that the number of agents that choose alg1 is at least
β0(1/2− β1)t/5, where the function
q2(x) = exp
(−(1/2− β1)(1− β0/5)2x
3
)
.
Note that the number of agents received by alg2 is at most T1 + (1/2+ β1)t + (1/2− β1)(1− β0/5)t.
Then as long as T2 ≥ 5T1β0 , we can guarantee that n1(t) > n2(t)(1− β0) and n1(t) > n0 with prob-
ability at least 1 − q2(t) for any t ≥ T1 + T2. Note that the weak BIR-dominance condition in (25)
implies that for any t ≥ T1 +T2 with probability at least 1− q2(t),
BIR1(n1(t)) < (1−α0)BIR2(n2(t)).
It follows that for any t ≥ T1 +T2,
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) = E
m1∼N1,t , m2∼N2,t
[BIR2(m2 +1)− BIR1(m1 +1)]
≥ (1− q2(t))α0BIR2(t)− q2(t)
≥ α0BIR2(t)/4
where the last inequality holds as long as q2(t) ≤ α0BIR2(t)/4, and is implied by the condition
in (27) as long as T2 is sufficiently large. Hence, by the definition of our SoftMax response function
and assumption in (22), we have
Pr[it = 1] ≥
1
2
+
c0α0BIR2(t)
4
.
Similar to the condition (15), we can also generalize the weak BIR-dominance condition (25)
to handle the dependence on T : there exist some T0, a function n0(T ) ∈ polylog(T ), and constants
β0,α0 ∈ (0,1/2), such that
(∀T ≥ T0,n ≥ n0(T ))
BIR1((1− β0)n | T )
BIR2(n | T )
< 1−α0. (29)
We also provide a version of Theorem 6.3 under this more general weak BIR-dominance con-
dition; its proof is very similar and is omitted. The following is just a direct consequence of
Theorem 6.3 with this general condition.
Corollary 6.6. Assume that the response function is SoftMax, and each principal’s utility is the number
of users. Consider the restricted competition game in which the special algorithm alg weakly-BIR-
dominates the other allowed algorithms, and the latter satisfy BReg(n)→∞. Then, for any sufficiently
large time horizon T , there is a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
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Competitiveness/Rationality
Better algorithm in equilibrium
Uniform SoftMax HardMax&Random HardMax
Figure 3: The stylized inverted-U relationship in the “main story”.
7 Economic implications
We frame our contributions in terms of the relationship between competitiveness and rationality
on one side, and adoption of better algorithms on the other. Recall that both competitiveness (of
the game between the two principals) and rationality (of the agents) are controlled by the response
function fresp.
Main story. Our main story concerns the restricted competition game between the two principals
where one allowed algorithm alg is “better” than the others. We track whether and when alg is
chosen in an equilibrium. We vary competitiveness/rationality by changing the response function
from HardMax (full rationality, very competitive environment) to HardMax&Random to SoftMax
(less rationality and competition). Our conclusions are as follows:
• Under HardMax, no innovation: DynamicGreedy is chosen over alg.
• Under HardMax&Random, some innovation: alg is chosen as long as it BIR-dominates.
• Under SoftMax, more innovation: alg is chosen as long as it weakly-BIR-dominates.8
These conclusions follow, respectively, from Corollaries 4.2, 5.3 and 6.4. Further, we consider
the uniform choice between the principals. It corresponds to the least amount of rationality and
competition, and (when principals’ utility is the number of agents) uniform choice provides no
incentives to innovate.9 Thus, we have an inverted-U relationship, see Figure 3.
Secondary story. Let us zoom in on the symmetric HardMax&Randommodel. Competitiveness and
rationality within this model are controlled by the baseline probability ǫ0 = fresp(−1), which goes
smoothly between the two extremes of HardMax (ǫ0 = 0) and the uniform choice (ǫ0 =
1
2 ). Smaller
ǫ0 corresponds to increased rationality and increased competitiveness. For clarity, we assume that
principal’s utility is the number of agents.
We consider the marginal utility of switching to a better algorithm. Suppose initially both
principals use some algorithm alg, and principal 1 ponders switching to another algorithm alg’
which BIR-dominates alg. We are interested in the marginal utility of this switch. Then:
8This is a weaker condition, the better algorithm is chosen in a broader range of scenarios.
9On the other hand, if principals’ utility is somewhat aligned with agents’ welfare, as in (5), then a monopolist
principal is incentivized to choose the best possible MAB algorithm (namely, to minimize cumulative Bayesian regret
BReg(T )). Accordingly, monopoly would result in better social welfare than competition, as the latter is likely to split
the market and cause each principal to learn more slowly. This is a very generic and well-known effect regarding
economies of scale.
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ǫ0
marginal utility
Uniform
0
HardMax
1/2
Figure 4: The stylized inverted-U relationship from the “secondary story”
• ǫ0 = 0 (HardMax): the marginal utility can be negative if alg is DynamicGreedy.
• ǫ0 near 0: only a small marginal utility can be guaranteed, as it may take a long time for
alg′ to “catch up” with alg, and hence less time to reap the benefits.
• “medium-range” ǫ0: large marginal utility, as alg
′ learns fast and gets most agents.
• ǫ0 near
1
2 : small marginal utility, as principal 1 gets most agents for free no matter what.
The familiar inverted-U shape is depicted in Figure 4.
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A Background on multi-armed bandits
This appendix provides some pertinent background on multi-armed bandits (MAB). We discuss
BIR andmonotonicity of severalMAB algorithms, touching upon: DynamicGreedy and StaticGreedy
(Section A.1), “naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation (Section A.2),
and “smart” MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation (Section A.3).
As we do throughout the paper, we focus on MAB with i.i.d. rewards and a Bayesian prior; we
call it Bayesian MAB for brevity.
A.1 DynamicGreedy and StaticGreedy
We provide an example when DynamicGreedy and StaticGreedy have constant BIR, and prove
monotonicity of DynamicGreedy. For the example, it suffices to consider deterministic rewards (for
each action a, the realized reward is always equal to themean µa) and independent priors (according
to the prior Pmean, random variables µ1 , . . . ,µK are mutually independent) each of full support.
The following claim is immediate from the definition of the CDF function
Claim A.1. Assume independent priors. Let Fi be the CDF of the mean reward µi of action ai ∈ A.
Then, for any numbers z2 > z1 > E[µ2] we have Pr[µ1 ≤ z1 and µ2 ≥ z2] = F1(z1)(1− F2(z2)).
We can now draw an immediate corollary of the above claim
Corollary A.2. Consider any problem instance of Bayesian MAB with two actions and independent
priors which are full support. Then:
(a) With constant probability, StaticGreedy has a constant BIR for all steps.
(b) Assuming deterministic rewards, with constant probability DynamicGreedy has a constant BIR
for all steps.
Remark A.3. A similar result holds for rewards which are distributed as Bernoulli random vari-
ables. In this case we consider accumulative reward of an action as a randomwalk, and use a high
probability variation of the law of iterated logarithms. (Details omitted.)
Next, we show that DynamicGreedy is monotone.
Lemma A.4. DynamicGreedy is monotone, in the sense that rew(n) is non-decreasing. Further, rew(n)
is strictly increasing for every time step n with Pr[an , an+1] > 0.
Proof. We prove by induction on n that rew(n) ≤ rew(n + 1) for DynamicGreedy. Let an be the
random variable recommended at time t, then E[µan |In] = rew(n). We can rewrite this as:
rew(n) = E
In
[E
rn
[µan |rn,In]] = EIn+1[µan |In+1]
since In+1 = (In, rn). At time n+1 DynamicGreedy will select an action an+1 such that:
rew(n+1) =E[µan+1 |In+1] ≥ E[µan |In] = rew(n)
which proves the monotonicity. In cases that Pr[an , an+1] > 0] we have a strict inequality, since
with some probability we select a better action then the realization of an.
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A.2 “Naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation
MAB algorithm ExplorExploit (m) initially explores each action with m agents and for the re-
maining T − |A|m agents recommends the action with the highest observed average. In the explore
phase it assigns a random permutation of the mK recommendations.
Lemma A.5. The ExplorExploit (T 2/3 log |A|/δ) algorithm has, with probability 1 − δ, for any n ≥
|A|T 2/3 we have BIR (n) =O(T −1/3). In addition, ExplorExploit (m) is monotone.
Proof. In the explore phase we we approximate for each action a ∈ A, the value of µa by µˆa. Using
the standard Chernoff bounds we have that with probability 1− δ, for every action a ∈ A we have
|µa − µˆa| ≤ T −1/3.
Let a∗ = argmaxaµa and aee the action that ExplorExploit selects in the explore phase after
the first |A|T 2/3 agents. Since µˆa∗ ≤ µˆaee , this implies that µa∗ −µaee =O(T −1/3).
To show that ExplorExploit (m) is monotone, we need to show only that rew(mK) ≤ rew(mK+
1). This follows since for any t < mK we have rew(t) = rew(t +1), since the recommended action is
uniformly distributed for each time t. Also, for any t ≥ mK + 1 we have rew(t) = rew(t + 1) since
we are recommending the same exploration action. The proof that rew(mK) ≤ rew(mK + 1) is the
same as for DynamicGreedy in Lemma A.4.
We can also have a a phased version which we call PhasedExplorExploit (mt), where time is
partition in to phases. In phase t we have mt agents and a random subset of K explore the actions
(each action explored by a single agent) and the other agents exploit. (This implies that we need
that mt ≥ K for all t. We also assume that mt is monotone in t.)
Lemma A.6. Consider the case that K = 2 and the rewards of the actions are Bernoulli r.v. with param-
eter µi and ∆ = µ1 − µ2. Algorithm PhasedExplorExploit (mt) is monotone and for mt =
√
t it has
BIR(n) =O(n−1/3 + e−O(∆2n2/3))).
Proof. We first show that it is monotone. Recall that µ1 > µ2. Let Si =
∑t
j=1 ri,j be the sum of
the rewards of action i up to phase t. We need to show that Pr[S1 > S2] + (1/2)Pr[S1 = S2] is
monotonically increasing in t. Consider the random variableZ = S1−S2. At each phase it increases
by +1 with probability µ1(1− µ2), decreases by −1 with probability (1− µ1)µ2 and otherwise does
not change.
Consider the values of Z up to phase t. We really care only about the probability that is shifted
from positive to negative and vice versa.
First, consider the probability that Z = 0. We can partition it to S1 = S2 = r events, and let
p(r, r) be the probability of this event. For each such event, we have p(r, r)µ1 moved to Z = +1 and
p(r, r)µ2 moved to Z = −1. Since µ1 > µ2 we have that p(r, r)µ1 ≥ p(r, r)µ2 (note that p(r, r) might be
zero, so we do not have a strict inequality).
Second, consider the probability that Z = +1 or Z = −1. We can partition it to S1 = r +1;S2 = r
and S1 = r;S2 = r + 1 events, and let p(r + 1, r) and p(r, r + 1) be the probabilities of those events.
It is not hard to see that p(r + 1, r)µ2 = p(r, r + 1)µ1. This implies that the probability mass moved
from Z = +1 to Z = 0 is identical to that moved from Z = −1 to Z = 0.
We have showed that Pr[S1 > S2] + (1/2)Pr[S1 = S2] and therefore the expected valued of the
exploit action is non-decreasing. Since we have that the size of the phases are increasing, the BIR
is strictly increasing between phases and identical within each phase.
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We now analyze the BIR regret. Note that agent n is in phase O(n2/3) and the length of his
phase is O(n1/3). The BIR has two parts. The first is due to the exploration, which is at most
O(n−1/3). The second is due to the probability that we exploit the wrong action. This happens
with probability Pr[S1 < S2] + (1/2)Pr[S1 = S2] which we can bound using a Chernoff bound by
e−O(∆2n2/3), since we explored each action O(n2/3) times.
Remark A.7. Actually we have a tradeoff depending on the parameter mt between the regret due
to exploration and exploitation. (Note that the monotonicity is always guarantee assuming mt is
monotone.) If we can set that mt = 2
t then at time n we have 2/n probability of an exploit action.
For the explore action we are in phase logn so the probability of a sub-optimal explore action is
n−O(∆−2). This should give us BIR(n) =O(n−O(∆−2)).
A.3 “Smart” MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation
MAB algorithm SuccesiveEliminationReset works as follows. It keeps a set of surviving actions
As ⊆ A, where initially As = A. The agents are partition into phases, where each phase is a random
permutation of the non-eliminated actions. Let µˆi,t be the average of the rewards of action i up
to phase t and µˆ∗ = maxi µˆi,t . We eliminate action i at the end of phase t, i.e., delete it from As,
if µˆ∗t − µˆi,t > log(T /δ)/
√
t. In SuccesiveEliminationReset we simply reset the algorithm with
A = As −Ae,t , where Ae,t is the set of eliminated actions after phase t. Namely, we restart µˆi,t and
ignore the old rewards before the elimination.
Lemma A.8. The algorithm SuccesiveEliminationReset, has, with probability 1 − δ, BIR (n) =
O(log(T /δ)/
√
n/K).
Proof. Let the best action be a∗ = argmaxaµa. With probability 1 − δ at any time n we have that
for any action i ∈ As that |µˆi − µi | ≤ log(T /δ)/
√
n/K , and a∗ ∈ As. This implies that any action a
such µa∗ − µa > 3log(T /δ)/
√
n/K is eliminated. Therefore, any action in As has BIR (n) of at most
6log(T /δ)/
√
n/K .
Lemma A.9. Assume that if µi ≥ µj then the rewards ri stochastically dominates the rewards rj . Then,
SuccesiveEliminationReset is monotone
Proof. Consider the first time T an action is eliminated, and let T = τ be a realized value of T .
Then, clearly for n < τ we have rew(n) = rew(1) .
Consider two actions a1,a2 ∈ A, such that µa1 ≥ µa2 . At time T = τ, the probability that a1 is
eliminated is smaller than the probability that a2 is eliminated. This follows since µˆa1 stochasti-
cally dominates µˆa2 , which implies that for any threshold θ we have Pr[µˆa1 ≥ θ] ≥ Pr[µˆa2 ≥ θ].
After the elimination we consider the expected reward of the eliminated action
∑
i∈Aµiqi ,
where qi is the probability that action i was eliminated in time T = τ. We have that qi ≤ qi+1,
from the probabilities of elimination.
The sum
∑
i∈Aµiqi with qi ≤ qi+1 and
∑
i qi = 1 is maximized by setting qi = 1/ |A|. (We can
see that if there are qi , 1/ |A|, then there are two qi < qi+1, and one can see that setting both to
(qi + qi+1)/2 increases the value.) Therefore we have that the rew(τ) ≥ rew(τ − 1).
Now we can continue by induction. For the induction, we can show the property for any
remaining set of at most k−1 actions. Themain issue is that SuccesiveEliminationReset restarts
from scratch, so we can use induction.
26
B Non-degeneracy via a random perturbation
We show that Assumption (4) holds almost surely under a small random perturbation of the prior.
We focus on problem instances with 0-1 rewards, and assume that the prior Pmean is independent
across arms and has a finite support.10 Consider the probability vector in the prior for arm a:
~pa = ( Pr[µa = ν] : ν ∈ support(µa) ) .
We apply a small random perturbation independently to each such vector:
~pa ← ~pa + ~qa, where ~qa ∼Na. (30)
Here Na is the noise distribution for arm a: a distribution over real-valued, zero-sum vectors of
dimension da = |support(µa)|. We need the noise distribution to satisfy the following property:
∀x ∈ [−1,1]da \ {0} Pr
q∼Na
[
x · (~pa + q) , 0
]
= 1. (31)
Theorem B.1. Consider an instance of MAB with 0-1 rewards. Assume that the prior Pmean is indepen-
dent across arms, and each mean reward µa has a finite support that does not include 0 or 1. Assume
that noise distributions Na satisfy property (31). If random perturbation (30) is applied independently
to each arm a, then Eq. 4 holds almost surely for each history h.
Remark B.2. As a generic example of a noise distribution which satisfies Property (31), consider
the uniform distributionN over the bounded convex set
Q =
{
q ∈ Rda | q ·~1 = 0 and ‖q‖2 ≤ ǫ
}
,
where ~1 denotes the all-1 vector. If x = a~1 for some non-zero value of a, then (31) holds because
x · (p + q) = x · p = a , 0.
Otherwise, denote p = ~pa and observe that x · (p + q) = 0 only if x · q = c , x · (−p). Since x , ~1, the
intersectionQ∩{x ·q = c} either is empty or has measure 0 inQ, which implies Prq [x · (p + q) , 0] =
1.
To prove Theorem B.1, it suffices to focus on two arms, and perturb one of them. Since realized
rewards have finite support, there are only finitely many possible histories. Therefore, it suffices
to focus on a fixed history h.
Lemma B.3. Consider an instance of MAB with 0-1 rewards. Assume that the prior Pmean is indepen-
dent across arms, and that support(µ1) is finite and does not include 0 or 1. Fix history h. Suppose
random perturbation (30) is applied to arm 1, with noise distribution N1 that satisfies (31). Then
E[µ1 | h] ,E[µ2 | h] almost surely.
10The assumption of 0-1 rewards is for clarity. Our results hold under a more general assumption that for each arm
a, rewards can only take finitely many values, and each of these values is possible (with positive probability) for every
possible value of the mean reward µa.
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Proof. Note that E[µa | h] does not depend on the algorithm which produced this history. There-
fore, for the sake of the analysis, we can assume w.l.o.g. that this history has been generated
by a particular algorithm, as long as this algorithm can can produce this history with non-zero
probability. Let us consider the algorithm that deterministically chooses same actions as h.
Let S = support(µ1). Then:
E[µ1 | h] =
∑
ν∈S
ν ·Pr[µ1 = ν | h] =
∑
ν∈S
ν ·Pr[h | µ1 = ν] ·Pr[µ1 = ν] / Pr[h],
Pr[h] =
∑
ν∈S
Pr[h | µ1 = ν] ·Pr[µ1 = ν].
Therefore, E[µ1 | h] = E[µ2 | h] if and only if∑
ν∈S
(ν −C) ·Pr[h | µ1 = ν] ·Pr[µ1 = ν] = 0, where C = E[µ2 | h].
Since E[µ2 | h] and Pr[h | µ1 = ν] do not depend on the probability vector ~p1, we conclude that
E[µ1 | h] = E[µ2 | h] ⇔ x · ~p1 = 0,
where vector
x := ( (ν −C) ·Pr[h | µ1 = ν] : ν ∈ S ) ∈ [−1,1]d1
does not depend on ~p1.
Thus, it suffices to prove that x · ~p1 , 0 almost surely under the perturbation. In a formula:
Pr
q∼N1
[
x · (~p1 + q) , 0
]
= 1 (32)
Note that Pr[h | µ1 = ν] > 0 for all ν ∈ S , because 0,1 < S . It follows that at most one coordinate
of x can be zero. So (32) follows from property (31).
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